UK Diplomats Advised Against Military Action to Topple Zimbabwe's Leader

Recently released documents show that the UK's diplomatic corps advised against British military action to remove the former Zimbabwean president, the long-serving leader, in 2004, stating it was not considered a "serious option".

Government Documents Reveal Considerations on Handling a "Remarkably Robust" Leader

Policy papers from Tony Blair's government show officials weighed up options on how best to handle the "depressingly healthy" 80-year-old leader, who refused to step down as the country fell into turmoil and financial collapse.

Following the ruling party winning a 2005 election, and a year after the UK joined a US-led coalition to overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, Downing Street asked the Foreign Office in July 2004 to develop potential options.

Isolation Strategy Deemed Ineffective

Diplomats concluded that the UK's strategy to isolate Mugabe and forging an international agreement for change was failing, having not managed to secure support from key African nations, notably the then South African president, Thabo Mbeki.

Courses considered in the files included:

• "Seek to remove Mugabe by force";
• "Go for tougher UK measures" such as freezing assets and shuttering the UK embassy; or
• "Re-open dialogue", the approach supported by the then departing ambassador to Zimbabwe.

"Our experience shows from conflicts abroad that changing a government and/or its harmful policies is exceedingly difficult from the outside."

The FCO paper rejected military action as not a "serious option," and warned that "The only candidate for leading such a armed intervention is the UK. No other country (even the US) would be willing to do so".

Cautionary Notes of Heavy Casualties and Jurisdictional Barriers

It warned that military intervention would result in heavy casualties and have "considerable implications" for UK nationals in Zimbabwe.

"Barring a major humanitarian and political catastrophe – resulting in widespread bloodshed, significant exodus of refugees, and regional instability – we judge that no nation in Africa would agree to any attempts to remove Mugabe forcibly."

The document adds: "We also believe that any other European, Commonwealth or western partner (including the US) would sanction or participate in military intervention. And there would be no jurisdictional basis for doing so, without an authorising Security Council Resolution, which we would not get."

Playing the Longer Game Advocated

The Prime Minister's advisor, Laurie Lee, warned him that Zimbabwe "will be a real spoiler" to his plan to use the UK's presidency of the G8 to make 2005 "a pivotal year for Africa". Lee concluded that as military action had been discounted, "it is likely necessary that we must play the longer game" and re-open talks with Mugabe.

Blair appeared to agree, noting: "We should work out a way of exposing the falsehoods and misconduct of Mugabe and Zanu-PF ahead of this election and then afterwards, we could attempt to restart dialogue on the basis of a firm agreement."

The departing ambassador, in his final diplomatic dispatch, had recommended cautious renewed contact with Mugabe, though he understood the Prime Minister "would likely be appalled given all that Mugabe has uttered and perpetrated".

The Zimbabwean leader was ultimately removed in a 2017 coup, at the age of 93. Earlier assertions that in the early 2000s Blair had tried to pressure the South African president into joining a military coalition to overthrow Mugabe were strongly denied by the ex-British leader.